Extrinsic Evidence
Posted: Fri May 02, 2014 3:55 pm
Generally, where a contract or deed are unambiguous on their face, extrinsic or parol evidence will not be admitted to vary the terms of the deed or contract.
Except that they will, ha ha.
I was looking into California's Practical Location Doctrine (where a grantor conveys a portion of his tract and marks the new boundary on the ground, that will prevail against the description in the deed). It turns out part of the problem with this is it conflicts with the parol evidence rule.
An important case, French v. Brinkman, 60 Cal. 2d 547 (1963), is cited by many subsequent cases as allowing an exception to the rule prohibiting extrinsic evidence modifying an unambiguous contract (including cases outside of real property). French seems to require a mutual mistake but another case citing it more or less says words are just ambiguous unlike mathematical formulas and besides you need testimony to determine if interpretation of the grant is susceptible to more than one meaning...
From Murphy Slough Assn. v. Avila, 27 Cal. App. 3d 649 (1972):
"As a point of departure we must first decide the propriety of the trial court's considering evidence extrinsic to the deed in determining the nature of the interest conveyed.
In Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, at page 37 [69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641, 4 A.L.R.3d 1373], our Supreme Court ruled that the test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible. [Citations]. The court stated that a rule that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written instrument to its four corners merely because it seems to be clear and unambiguous would either deny the relevance of the intention of the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not attained.
"If words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to discover contractual intention in the words themselves and in the manner in which they were arranged. Words, however, do not have absolute and constant referents. 'A word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning like a symbol of algebra or chemistry, . . .' ( Pearson v. State Social Welfare Board (1960) 54 Cal.2d 184, 195. . . .) The meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with the '. . . verbal context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in view of the linguistic education and experience of their users and their hearers or readers (not excluding judges) . . . . A word has no meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an objective meaning, one true meaning.' (Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule (1965) 50 Cornell L.Q. 161, 187.) Accordingly, the meaning of a writing '. . . can only be found by interpretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal the sense in which the writer used the words. The exclusion of parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because the words do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily lead to the attribution to a written instrument of a meaning that was never intended. . . .' [Citations.]" ( Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co., supra, 69 Cal.2d 33, at pp. 38-39.)
If the trial court decides after considering the extrinsic evidence that the language of the instrument in the light of all the circumstances is susceptible of either one of the two interpretations contended for, extrinsic evidence relevant to prove either of such meanings is admissible. [citations].
That this interpretive rule is applicable to deeds as well as to contracts and wills, see French v. Brinkman (1963) 60 Cal.2d 547, 552-553..."
Except that they will, ha ha.
I was looking into California's Practical Location Doctrine (where a grantor conveys a portion of his tract and marks the new boundary on the ground, that will prevail against the description in the deed). It turns out part of the problem with this is it conflicts with the parol evidence rule.
An important case, French v. Brinkman, 60 Cal. 2d 547 (1963), is cited by many subsequent cases as allowing an exception to the rule prohibiting extrinsic evidence modifying an unambiguous contract (including cases outside of real property). French seems to require a mutual mistake but another case citing it more or less says words are just ambiguous unlike mathematical formulas and besides you need testimony to determine if interpretation of the grant is susceptible to more than one meaning...
From Murphy Slough Assn. v. Avila, 27 Cal. App. 3d 649 (1972):
"As a point of departure we must first decide the propriety of the trial court's considering evidence extrinsic to the deed in determining the nature of the interest conveyed.
In Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, at page 37 [69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641, 4 A.L.R.3d 1373], our Supreme Court ruled that the test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible. [Citations]. The court stated that a rule that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written instrument to its four corners merely because it seems to be clear and unambiguous would either deny the relevance of the intention of the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not attained.
"If words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to discover contractual intention in the words themselves and in the manner in which they were arranged. Words, however, do not have absolute and constant referents. 'A word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning like a symbol of algebra or chemistry, . . .' ( Pearson v. State Social Welfare Board (1960) 54 Cal.2d 184, 195. . . .) The meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with the '. . . verbal context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in view of the linguistic education and experience of their users and their hearers or readers (not excluding judges) . . . . A word has no meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an objective meaning, one true meaning.' (Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule (1965) 50 Cornell L.Q. 161, 187.) Accordingly, the meaning of a writing '. . . can only be found by interpretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal the sense in which the writer used the words. The exclusion of parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because the words do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily lead to the attribution to a written instrument of a meaning that was never intended. . . .' [Citations.]" ( Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co., supra, 69 Cal.2d 33, at pp. 38-39.)
If the trial court decides after considering the extrinsic evidence that the language of the instrument in the light of all the circumstances is susceptible of either one of the two interpretations contended for, extrinsic evidence relevant to prove either of such meanings is admissible. [citations].
That this interpretive rule is applicable to deeds as well as to contracts and wills, see French v. Brinkman (1963) 60 Cal.2d 547, 552-553..."